Since the beginning of 2024, reports of violent incidents targeting political figures have frequently made their way into the news in the states of Mexico, Puebla, and Veracruz. On 23 March, several armed men on motorcycles killed the mayoral candidate of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party running in Acatzingo municipality in Puebla, adding yet another victim to the list of candidates, current and former officials, relatives of politicians, and election officers who have been the targets of violence in recent months. These recent incidents are part of a repeated pattern of violence. Situated in central Mexico, the states of Mexico, Puebla, and Veracruz feature among the eight most affected by violence targeting political figures since 2018.
As in the rest of the country, the violence in these states consists mainly of targeted armed attacks that are often linked to organized crime. At the same time, these states also exhibit elevated levels of riots, property destruction, and other intimidation tactics aimed at disrupting electoral processes, which is indicative of conflict dynamics that likely go beyond the traditional explanation of organized crime. Labor unions’ interests, access to water and electricity, and regional political elites’ struggles — often led by local leaders, or caciques — are common drivers of violence against political figures. For instance, on 10 February, a group of 10 people participated in the killing of Yair Martín Romero, a MORENA candidate running for federal deputy in Ecatepec, Mexico. The prosecutor’s office notably linked the attack to a conflict between a transportation workers union led by Martín and USON, a federation of transport and pipe workers unions. USON was apparently trying to force a local group of transport workers from Martín’s union to affiliate with the federation.1El Financiero, ‘Tiros, puñaladas y 10 sicarios: Video muestra cómo y quiénes asesinaron a Yair Romero, aspirante de Morena,’ 3 March 2024
Although a significant share of violence targeting political figures responds to these local dynamics, attacks perpetrated by organized crime groups remain a constant feature in Mexican politics, and Puebla, Veracruz, and Mexico are no exceptions. In these states, competition among criminal groups, which is a key driver of violence targeting political figures in states like Guerrero, Michoacán, and Guanajuato, is important but less explosive than in others. In fact, Veracruz, Puebla, and Mexico are the states with the seventh-, eighth-, and 11th-highest number of political violence events likely involving criminal groups (see maps below).
This report analyzes the drivers of the targeting of political figures in the states of Puebla, Veracruz, and Mexico. It sheds light on hybrid violence taking place around elections, which makes up a significant share of violence in those states. The finding suggests that violence is more likely to be influenced by local power dynamics that are not always directly related to criminal groups, such as competition between candidates and the interference of interest groups and other power brokers. However, the penetration of organized crime at all institutional levels is also likely responsible for most of the other direct forms of violence, such as attacks and abductions. It has concentrated in hotspots of gang violence, with groups fighting for control of key infrastructure such as oil pipelines and trafficking routes.
Riots and Property Destruction: Tracing Political Contenders’ Rivalries
Violence targeting political figures is not only driven by organized crime, but, often, it is linked to deeply rooted cultural manifestations of power, including trade unions, vigilante groups, state actors, and local power brokers — also known as cacicazgos — usually a single leader or a family. Decades ago, gun violence promoted by the cacicazgos served as a form of control and helped buttress the hegemonic regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). But while back then, the violence was markedly rural and associated with disputes over land or intra-union conflicts, it has now spilled over to electoral competition, particularly since the PRI lost its political hegemony in 1989.2Víctor Manuel Andrade Guevara, ‘Veracruz, entre la inseguridad y la impunidad,’ Animal Político, 4 September 2023 As security expert Gema Kloppe-Santamaría argued, local caciques are the de facto authorities in several municipalities and, hence, acts of intimidation and violence are unlikely to occur without their approval or even their active participation in places where they hold power.3Gema Kloppe-Santamaría, ‘Mexico’s recent election violence can’t be blamed on organized crime gangs alone,’ Open Democracy, 10 June 2021
Pinpointing the direct involvement of local power brokers in violent incidents targeting political figures remains challenging due to high impunity rates. Nevertheless, local power brokers have long mobilized local populations or mobs to coerce their political adversaries or those opposing their interests. Recent examples help illustrate these power dynamics. For instance, in Ayahualulco, Veracruz, a group of PRI supporters assaulted a municipal councilor during a local council session in September 2022. The victim claimed that the violence was orchestrated by the PRI mayor to silence his inquiries about the municipality’s finances.4Claudia Montero. ‘Golpean a Regidor de Ayahualulco en sesión de Cabildo,’ Al Calor Político, 22 September 2022 Similarly, in November 2022, the treasurer of Sayula de Alemán, Veracruz, accused the MORENA-affiliated mayor of sending armed men to ransack his home to force him to resign. The treasurer had raised questions about whether the mayor was diverting municipal resources.5Crónica Veracruz, Grupo armado allana domicilio del tesorero Rafael González Cárdenas de Sayula,’ 13 November 2022 Months later, Sayula de Alemán municipal workers accused the mayor of using a violent mob to forcibly remove them from the city council building, which they were occupying to demand overdue salaries.6Itzel Molina, ‘Conflicto en Sayula: hombres ingresan al Palacio Municipal tomado por trabajadores,’ Diario de Xalapa, 16 January 2023
The violence between political contenders also manifests in other ways, such as riots, looting, and property destruction, including the theft and burning of ballot boxes, as well as shootings toward candidates’ or parties’ properties as an intimidation tactic, which tends to intensify during elections. Puebla, Veracruz, and Mexico are among the states recording the highest number of these events during election years (see graph below). Ahead of the vote, ACLED records incidents aiming at political figures to impede campaign activities of a certain party in a given area, which, at times, can also spark clashes between different parties’, or the same party’s, supporters.7Noria Research, ‘Political-Electoral Violence in Mexico, 2020-2021. What the Data Shows, and What it Hides.,’ 22 June 2021 For example, on 14 February 2021, supporters of a National Action Party (PAN) leader, who was apparently set to narrowly lose a party primary to choose a Veracruz mayoral candidate, started a brawl at a party assembly.8Édgar Ávila Pérez, ‘Militantes del PAN en Veracruz se agarraron a sillazos tras disputa por elección interna,’ El Universal, 15 February 2021
Similarly, in Mexico and Puebla, ACLED records several events accounting for the dispute between political parties, especially MORENA and the Movimiento Antorchista — also known as Antorcha Campesina, or Torch Movement — a political organization that previously held ties with the PRI and advocates for Mexico’s marginalized population. Political parties have accused the Movimiento Antorchista of using cacique-like tactics, such as electoral manipulation and voter intimidation, to maintain its power base. In 2021, Antorchistas notably held a candidate inside a house in Ixtapaluca, Mexico, to prevent the distribution of food supplies and water as part of electoral campaigning.9Proceso, ‘Supuestos antorchistas agreden a candidato de Morena en Ixtapaluca,’ 28 April 2021 Conversely, Antorcha Campesina has accused MORENA and state authorities under the party governance of electoral interference and spreading disinformation to weaken its position.10Oficina de prensa del Movimiento Antorchista Estado de México, ‘Antorcha rechaza acusaciones de Morena,’ Movimiento Antorchista Nacional, 17 May 2021
Although power struggles between political contenders tend to intensify during electoral campaigns, it is during the vote and the days following that ACLED records the greatest spikes in riots and property destruction, often propelled by allegations of electoral fraud and other electoral disputes. In 2018, in Puebla, the elections were marred by reports of ballot thefts and destruction of electoral material. MORENA party supporters notably questioned the victory of Martha Erika Alonso Hidalgo — candidate for Puebla’s state governor for the Por Puebla al Frente coalition — leading to a clash between MORENA and PAN supporters in a hotel in Puebla city. Similarly, in Veracruz, in 2021, ACLED records the burning and theft of ballots in several municipalities, which are indicative of tensions between competing political contenders amid the rising influence of the MORENA party in the state since 2018 and local caciques holding to power. For instance, in Tantoyuca municipality, unidentified individuals burned an electoral package during the 2021 election amid electoral irregularities claims. That year, MORENA won a federal deputy seat for the Tantoyuca jurisdiction,11W Radio, ‘Elecciones México 2021. Morena gana en Tantoyuca, bastión con mayor número de panistas en el país,’ 11 June 2021 considered the PAN’s historic bastion, while the municipal candidate of the local cacique family in power for decades secured the reelection of his clan by a small margin.12Ángel Camarillo, ‘No hubo “minimonarquías”: las familias que perdieron las elecciones en Veracruz,’ Al Calor Político, 7 June 2021
While riots and property destruction often signal conflict related to competition between politicians, the politicians themselves sometimes also participate in direct attacks against their competitors, including those within the same party. For example, in 2019, a MORENA municipal administrator was detained for his involvement in the killing of the mayor of Mixtla de Altamirano, who belonged to the same party.13Isabel Ortega, ‘6 políticos de Morena en Veracruz involucrados en hechos de violencia,’ La Silla Rota, 24 August 2022 A similar episode occurred in 2021, when the mayor-elect of Cazones, Veracruz, from the Citizen Movement party (MC), was detained for his alleged involvement in the killing of the MC’s initial candidate for the mayorship.14Expansión Política, ‘El alcalde electo de Cazones es detenido por el asesinato de un candidato de MC,’ 23 June 2021 In other cases, the involvement of politicians in violence is less overt; political contenders have hired hitmen to target rivals, further blurring the line between inter-candidate violence and violence originating from organized crime groups.15Jorge Zepeda Patterson, ‘Sicarios en las urnas ¿qué sigue?,’ El País, 26 May 2021
The shadow of a scattered organized crime landscape
While Mexico, Puebla, and Veracruz do not rank among the states with the highest levels of gang-related political violence, they are not immune to organized crime groups and their use of violence against political figures. In most cases, armed groups involved in political violence remain unidentified, but ACLED data show that almost 40 organized crime groups operate in Puebla, and over 20 operate in Mexico and Veracruz. These are mostly local groups involved in fuel theft (known as huachicol),16In Puebla, the areas most affected by oil theft are San Martin Texmelucán, where the Independencia Petrochemical Complex is located, and the Minatitlán-Mexico Valley pipeline. drug peddling, robberies, and extortion. However, bigger outfits also compete for control of drug trafficking routes, particularly those that connect with the Veracruz port, and migrant smuggling routes from Chiapas and Tabasco.17Rubi Martinez, ‘Crimen organizado en Veracruz: estos son los cárteles de drogas que operan en la entidad,’ Infobae, 20 February 2024; Alejandro Villegas, ‘¿La Familia Michoacana opera en Puebla? Un vistazo a los grupos criminales activos en el estado,’ El Universal Puebla, 9 December 2023 ; Joel Cano, ‘Cuáles son los cárteles que se disputan el control del Edomex,’ Infobae, 26 October 2023 This competition has often translated into attacks against political figures in attempts to co-opt local authorities or weaken rival groups’ political connections, both during and outside electoral processes.
In Veracruz, mafias started to infiltrate the state in the early 2000s, when then-governor Fidel Herrera, of the PRI, allegedly allowed the Gulf Cartel to set up shop in the state in exchange for contributions to his electoral campaign.18Elyssa Pachico, ‘Testimony Describes Zetas’ Ties to Mexico Governor,’ InSight Crime, 11 September 2014 Nowadays, seven criminal groups are believed to control 66% of Veracruz’s surface area, spread throughout 89 municipalities,19Infobae, ‘Por qué Veracruz es el estado con el mayor número de personas afectadas por la violencia,’ 22 June 2023 and many of these groups reportedly have connections with state-level officials.20ACLED interview with a security expert, 21 February 2024; Ricardo Ravelo, ‘Veracruz: El narcogobierno de Cuitláhuac García,’ Sin Embargo, 16 November 2023 The influence of competing criminal groups on political institutions has made Veracruz one of the states with the highest levels of direct attacks against political figures, with a notable increase in events during the 2021 elections. Violence is higher in those places where competition is more fierce. Since 2018, most events have taken place in the central and southern parts of the state, which, according to InSight Crime, coincide with the areas where competition between the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and remnants of the Zetas cartel is most intense.21Max Radwin and Chris Dalby, ‘Why is Veracruz Mexico’s Most Dangerous State for Political Murders?,’ Insight Crime, 3 June 2021 In fact, in the central part of the state, the targeting of political figures is significant in the Las Montañas region, where high levels of gang-related violence revolve around extortion and the struggle to control fuel theft and drug trafficking routes (see map below).22Infobae, ‘CJNG, Zetas, huachicol y robo: los detalles detrás de la balacera en Orizaba,’ 13 September 2022; Isabel Ortega, ‘Hay relación en crímenes de políticos en Las Altas Montañas: Cuitláhuac,’ E-Consulta, 2 January 2023
In the south, ACLED records some of the highest levels of violence targeting political figures in the Olmeca region in the municipalities of Acayucan and Coatzacoalcos, which also register the most gang-related events since 2018. Criminal disputes in the area concern control of the Interoceanic Corridor, a large-scale infrastructure project that aims to connect the Coatzacoalcos port in Veracruz with the Salina Cruz port in Oaxaca. In this part of the state, the penetration of criminal interests in certain municipalities of Veracruz is such that local officials appear to not only have connections with, but sometimes even lead, criminal structures. For example, the family of the former mayor of Cosoleacaque, southern Veracruz, who was murdered in February 2021, ran a group known as ‘La Banda de los Merlín.’23Max Radwin and Chris Dalby, ‘Why is Veracruz Mexico’s Most Dangerous State for Political Murders?, Insight Crime, 3 June 2021 In Acayucan, the director of urban development of the municipal administration was detained in early 2024 for leading a kidnapping gang.24Sayda Chiñas, ‘Detienen a funcionaria de Acayucan por vinculación con secuestradores,’ La Jornada Veracruz, 29 January 2024
In Puebla, beyond the CJNG and the Familia Michoacana, authorities have identified operations of the Sinaloa cartel and remnants of the Zetas cartel.25Jesús Zavala, ‘Crimen organizado, cárteles y capos; así ha sido su paso por Puebla,’ Milenio, 16 December 2023 However, together with Mexico and Veracruz, the state is one of the flashpoints for fuel theft, or huachicol, a practice that has soared in recent years since the removal of subsidies increased fuel prices and economic returns, fueling competition between a growing number of criminal groups.26Nathan P. Jones and John P. Sullivan, ‘Huachicoleros: Criminal Cartels, Fuel Theft, and Violence in Mexico,’ Journal of Strategic Security Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 12, N. 4, pp. 1-24, 2019 As an illustration, between 2012 and 2018 the number of clandestine gasoline grabs in Puebla grew by approximately 18 times, from 110 to 2072, according to Puebla’s State Council for Coordination of the National Public Security System.27Christopher Mejía Rosas and Carlos Figueroa Ibarra, ‘Consideraciones sobre Violencia, Criminalidad y Elecciones en Puebla. Una Reflección de las Elecciones del 2018,’ Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 2023 Along with it, municipalities crossed by a pipeline have experienced high levels of gang-related violence in recent years (see map below), coupled with the increasing involvement of union leaders, mayors, police officers, and even Puebla’s ex-public security secretary in this activity.28International Crisis Group, ‘Keeping Oil from the Fire: Tackling Mexico’s Fuel Theft Racket,’ 25 March 2022 As a consequence, competition between organized crime groups has spilled into violence targeting political figures. For example, the mayor-elect of Nopalucan de la Granja, Puebla, was killed before starting his term in 2018 in an alleged settling of scores between huachicoleros, or oil-theft criminals.29Sin Embargo, ‘Alcalde de Nopalucan, Puebla, asesinado a tiros es relacionado con el huachicol y robo a trenes,’ 4 September 2018
In the state of Mexico, the Caballeros Templarios, the Familia Michoacana, Guerreros Unidos, and the CJNG vie for the control of opioids and marijuana production areas in the municipalities located in the Toluca Valley Metropolitan Zone. They continue to battle with other minor groups for the control of extortion rackets targeting local farms and businesses and of drug trafficking routes around Mexico City, with hotspots of violence in Ecatepec de Morelos, Toluca, Chalco, La Paz, Naucalpán de Juárez, and Nezahualcoyotl.30Joel Cano, ‘Cuáles son los cárteles que se disputan el control del Edomex,’ Infobae, 26 October 2023 These areas coincide with municipalities where ACLED records the highest levels of direct attacks against political figures, including La Paz, where armed men recently shot and injured the state attorney (see map below).
The attack on the state attorney is also indicative of a broader phenomenon, where armed groups attack not only politicians running in elections but also local government workers, such as municipal treasurers, security directors, and judicial workers. In fact, around half of the political figures who were victims of direct attacks between 2018 and April 2024 in Puebla, Veracruz, and Mexico were serving officials. These attacks do not necessarily occur around elections, hinting at sustained competition between organized crime groups seeking to co-opt local authorities in order to shape security operations and access public procurement projects.31International Crisis Group, ‘Mexico’s Forgotten Mayors: The Role of Local Government in Fighting Crime,’ 23 June 2023 Political figures continue to be exposed to armed groups’ attacks even after leaving office: ACLED records at least 90 attacks targeting former government officials in the same period of time.
2024 Elections: A Mixed Picture
The combination of the large share of public posts up for grabs and the continued violent disputes between organized crime groups risks creating a lethal mix for the 2024 elections in Mexico, Puebla, and Veracruz. This is likely to be particularly true in Mexico and Puebla, where citizens will vote in 3,836 municipal races — a number that accounts for around 20% of all races in Mexico’s 2024 elections. Notably, ACLED records that violence targeting political figures has largely affected those operating at the municipal level and tends to spike around the municipal electoral cycle (see graph below). Veracruz is a significant example: during the 2021 electoral process, which included municipal elections, the number of recorded incidents more than doubled compared to the 2018 electoral process, when voters elected only the governor and state deputies. Against that backdrop, in 2024, armed groups targeted several candidates running in the municipal elections following the beginning of pre-campaigns, the period when aspiring candidates start carrying out public activities. Some of this violence is linked to tensions within parties and political coalitions over the nomination of the candidate, as seen with armed men shooting at the house of a MORENA former municipal official in the Mexico state after she criticized the party’s internal nomination process.32Manuel López, ‘Balean vivienda de ex regidora de La Paz, tras criticar a Morena en Edomex,’ La Silla Rota, 19 March 2024
However, the elections for governor and state deputy seats could also contribute to an increase in violence. The 2018 elections for governor in Puebla are a striking example of how a tight race and electoral irregularities can amplify election-related violence. Amid widespread irregularities on the day of the election, including the destruction or theft of ballot boxes, MORENA candidate Miguel Barbosa rejected the victory of the PAN-affiliated Martha Erika Alonso — wife of the then-outgoing governor Rafael Moreno Valle Rosas — and alleged that fraud had occurred, prompting a series of peaceful and violent demonstrations by MORENA supporters.33Elena Reina, ‘Balas, ‘mapaches’ y un supuesto fraude electoral: la nueva batalla de Puebla,’ El País, 7 July 2018
More generally, the effect of national party competition dynamics should not be underestimated as a likely driver of local violence in the 2024 elections. In the state of Mexico, the MORENA party will likely try to consolidate its victory in the 2023 gubernatorial elections with Delfina Gómez Álvarez by winning municipalities controlled by the PRI and PAN,34Rubén Pérez, ‘Morena va por municipios del PRI y PAN en el Edomex en este 2024,’ La Prensa, 15 January 2024 which could, in turn, lead to tensions at the local level on the day of the vote. At the same time, ACLED also records two attacks against candidates for representation at the federal level. Meanwhile, in Puebla and Veracruz states, voters will be electing two new governors, both key elections for MORENA. Party leaders highlighted these two states as important areas for the 4th Transformation,35David Meléndez, ‘AMLO confía en que Cuarta Transformación tenga continuidad en Puebla,’ Milenio, 19 February 2024 a plan announced by Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2019 to launch political, economic, and social reforms, including significant infrastructure projects. Although MORENA’s candidate for Veracruz governor holds a comfortable lead in the polls, some experts have raised the possibility of a sanction vote against MORENA’s outgoing state government due to high insecurity and allegations of abuse of power against the governor’s opponents.36Andro Aguilar, ‘Abuso e impunidad en Veracruz: acusan a Cuitláhuac García de usar Poder Judicial contra adversarios,’ Animal Político, 20 October 2023 Similarly, in Puebla, a challenge to the state governorship, currently held by MORENA, is unlikely, but a tighter political race at the municipal level — with MORENA currently governing in 42 of the 217 municipalities — could lead to heightened tensions around the vote.37Animal Político, ‘Puebla: gubernaturas fallidas y una trágica historia política anteceden las elecciones de 2024,’ 22 January 2024
The specter of organized crime also looms over these elections, as competition between rival criminal groups for the control of territories and local institutions continues to drive violence in those states. While Mexico state experienced a sustained decrease in past years, the first trimester of 2024 has seen a renewed uptick in armed violence, particularly in the Ecatepec de Morelos and Tultitlán municipalities. Far more concerning, however, is the situation in Puebla, where gang-related violence has been mounting since 2021, particularly in the capital, Puebla, as well as Amozoc and Tehuacán. In Veracruz, criminal competition remains stubbornly high.38Alejandro Santos Cid, ‘El crimen organizado arrecia su embestida sobre Veracruz y el sureste mexicano,’ El País, 14 February 2024 If, on one hand, gang-related violent events have been decreasing in the past few years, their lethality has increased: In 2023, the number of events decreased by 13% compared to 2022, while the number of reported fatalities increased by 9%. The municipality of Poza Rica stands out, as it is apparently at the center of a violent turf war between the CJNG and remnants of the Zetas for the control of oil theft activities.39El Financiero, ‘Poza Rica, el ‘botín petrolero’ que el CJNG y los Zetas se pelean en Veracruz,’ 15 August 2023
The vast amount of posts up for grabs, the persistently violent competition between organized crime groups for the control of illicit businesses, and the decisiveness of these elections for the consolidation of MORENA’s political primacy are likely to spur violence targeting political figures in these states in the upcoming elections.
